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ABSTRACT 
 
In today’s world where most of critical infrastructures are based on distributed systems, security failures, 
even within big corporations, have become very common. A system with security loopholes can be 
damaging for companies, both in terms of reputation and finances, while customers are reluctant to use 
such systems.  
In that respect, providing stakeholders with quantifiable evidences that the security countermeasures 
deployed on the system are operating adequately is an important step towards better control of security 
failures for network administrators on one hand, and an increase in end users’ trust in using those systems 
on the other. It is in that perspective that the Bugyo methodology [2] was proposed to address the 
shortcomings of existing security assurance and risks management methodologies in measuring, 
documenting and maintaining security assurance of telecommunication services. In this paper, we provide 
an overview of the Bugyo methodology and we specially demonstrate its applicability on a VoIP service 
infrastructure based on open source components.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The need to provide stakeholders with confidence that deployed security countermeasures meet their 
requirements at runtime has been acknowledged as a crucial issue [1] [2] [3]. This is mainly because, 
security countermeasures, even properly elucidated during the risks management stages, may be deployed 
inadequately or hazards in the system environment may render them less effective. When dealing with 
  
complex and critical systems such as telecommunication infrastructures, providing continuous monitoring 
so to get some assurance on the well-functioning of the system is paramount. This is due to the fact that 
such infrastructures are exposed to a continuously and permanently increasing set of risks and security 
threats [1] and furthermore, that recurrent telecommunication failures can negatively impact on the 
reputation of the service provider leading often to financial losses. 
  Current state of the art in security assurance has revealed the existence of several commercial initiatives 
(CYBERTRUST, Network security consulting, etc...), standards ([3],etc..), risks management 
methodologies   ([8][9][10][11][12]) as well as methodology proposed by the scientific community ( 
[4][5][13][14],etc..).  
However none of these methodologies fully addresses the issue of security assurance in telecommunication 
services or when they do, focus is only put either at products or systems level [3] or on the IT networks 
[4][5]. This has prompted the need for a new approach in measuring, documenting and maintaining security 
assurance for complex systems such as telecommunications services. In view of bridging that gap, The 
Bugyo (Building Security Assurance in Open Infrastructures) methodology has provided a framework that 
focuses on the telecommunication infrastructure and services to address the problem of security assurance 
in telecommunication. The methodology builds upon a well-known security assurance standards (the 
common criteria) [3] and aims at verifying that the services are securely provided through the 
infrastructures in addition to providing stakeholders with quantifiable measures on the reliability of the 
security countermeasures. In other words, Bugyo helps in providing security assurance, here defined as “the 
ground for confidence that an entity meets its security objectives”. The gathering of that measurable 
evidence is facilitated by the specification of metrics which are necessary for the normalization of the 
security assurance levels. 
  In this paper, we demonstrate how the Bugyo methodology can be applied in computing the assurance 
level of a VoIP service infrastructure through the specification of metrics.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. An overview of the Bugyo framework is provided in 
section 2. Section 3 focuses on the specification of the metrics and the evaluation of security assurances. 
An application on a VoIP service infrastructure is also demonstrated in this section 4 concludes the paper.  
 
2. The Bugyo operational methodology  
 
2.1. Steps of the methodology 
 
 The BUGYO methodology has three distinct functions that are mainly measurement, monitoring and 
assistance. To help in fulfilling those functions, the operational methodology [6] has been divided into six 
steps as depicted in figure 1. For paper limitations, stages of the methodology that are considered less 
relevant to the focus of this paper have been described just briefly. 
 
  
 
 
2.1.1 Service modeling 
 
The first step concerns services modeling. The modelling allows decomposing the service in order to 
identify assurance critical components. An efficient way of identifying those critical components is an a 
priori use of a risk assessment methodology. Weights are then assigned to each infrastructure object to 
account for their respective impact on the overall service 
 
2.1.2. Selection of metrics 
 
The second step is concerned with selecting the metrics. Metrics are used to measure the effectiveness of 
the deployed security countermeasures. The higher the level, the higher the confidence provided. It is 
however important to notify that a higher level of assurance will require more effort in deploying, 
monitoring and maintaining the probes.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                    Figure1.Steps of the Bugyo methodology  
 
To allow for a clear definition of assurance levels, a security assurance taxonomy is defined by BUGYO. 
According to the assurance taxonomy, the distinction between assurance levels is based on the Scope 
(broader scope gives more assurance), rigor (More details investigated gives more assurance), quantity of 
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for the service and provide comparison
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the verification of the security functions and the timeliness and reliability of the probes. 
Unlike the common criteria [3] that defines seven levels of assurance levels; BUGYO justifies the use of 
only five assurance levels base on the following pragmatic reasons:  
- We considered it important to have an odd number of assurance levels so that it is possible to have 
a medium assurance level (i.e. although only ordinal, the scale is required to have a conceptual 
middle point). 
- The CC evaluation assurance scheme contains seven evaluation assurance levels. However, to our 
knowledge (almost) none of the system has been evaluated higher than level five. With our 
scheme, we do not intent to reproduce levels that are not reachable. In general, systems are highly 
complex and it is unlikely for us that they can satisfy formal evaluation methods. Therefore it did 
not seem suitable to include levels that are only achievable formally. 
- To provide only three assurance levels did not provide enough granularity in our view as our 
intention is (a) the highest assurance levels should be very hard to achieve (but not impossible) 
and (b) the lowest assurance level can be achieved by setting up a control system (as it provides 
already a basic level of confidence). 
Our basic postulate is that assurance levels are ordinal (i.e. ordered with an undefined distance between 
values). A second postulate is that a higher level, we call it B, includes all assurance indications (i.e. 
requirements) of the level below it, which we call A. 
 
{ } { }BABA ⊂⇒<
 (Equation 1) 
To be complete (and compliant with our intention of an ordinal scale) we have to define an assurance level 
AL0 with no assurance indication (AL0 is the empty set) 
 AL0= {} (Equation 2) 
                                Table1. Assurance level table    
   
 For each security function (that performs a countermeasure), a metric is evaluated. A metric is a set of 
measures belonging to one of the three categories: Availability, Compliance and Vulnerability. 
There are two levels of aggregation to obtain the assurance metric of a security function (figure 2). The first 
one aims to aggregate measures in meta-measures (availability, compliance and vulnerability). The second 
one aims to aggregate these meta-measures. The aggregation functions might be generic or specific to a 
  
metric. 
  
2.1.3 Measurement 
                      
    During the third step, measurement, specific probes implementing metrics are deployed through the 
network. Those probes will help capture raw data from the infrastructure referred to as base measure in 
conformity with ISO 15939 [7]. Depending on the level of knowledge that the expert developing the probes 
hold on the security function, a measurement can be identified as white box measurement (he/she 
possesses the knowledge) or black box measurement (lack of the knowledge). By comparing the base 
measure to a reference measure, the concerned probes will evaluate whether a security function is operating 
in an effective way. The evaluation process will result in a derived measure that will then be normalized to 
produce an assurance level. 
 
2.1.4 Aggregation 
 
   Once the assurances level are determined at components level, an aggregation process is undertaken 
during step four, using a linear or non-linear algorithm, to compute the overall security assurance at 
infrastructures and service level. There are three main algorithms used for the operational aggregation [6]: 
the recursive minimum algorithm, the recursive maximum algorithm and the recursive weighted 
sum algorithm. 
   The recursive minimum algorithm, applied to systems with several critical points, implies that the 
overall assurance of a service is represented by the lowest metric of its components while the recursive 
maximum algorithm, however, commands that the assurance of a service be the highest of its components 
metrics. The recursive weighted sum algorithm is used for systems composed of security functions that 
contribute in different, non critical manner to the required service security implemented by independent 
observed system parts. It uses weight properties model to calculate the assurance level value at each level 
of the assurance model of a service and is more representative of the assurance needs described in the 
model. 
  
 
                       Figure2. Metrics representation 
2.1.5. Evaluation 
 
   The evaluation process consists in comparing the current value of the assurance level to the previous 
measure or to a certain threshold and issuing an appropriate message. In addition, it helps the operator in 
making appropriate decision based on the evaluation result.   
 
2.1.6. Monitoring 
 
The final step or monitoring step is concerned with providing a real time display of security assurance of 
the service to help the operator identify causes of security assurance deviation and also assist him/her in 
making decisions. 
 
2. 2. Architecture of the operational methodology 
 
The security assurance system is composed of three main components: the security cockpit, the security 
assurance server and the assurance measurement framework linked between then as shown in figure 3. 
The security cockpit is made of three distinct screens, one displaying a real-time value of the security 
assurance for each service, another presenting measurements history and other details so to enable the 
operator to appreciate on the deviation of the security assurance value. The last screen displays relevant 
information for the operator to take action in order to bring the security assurance level to an acceptable 
level. 
 
  
                      
               Figure3. Architecture of the security assurance system 
                           
    Operation such as base measures interpretation; normalization and aggregation take place at the server 
level. 
 
                Figure4. Multi-agents architecture for the measurement of security assurance 
As soon as measures results are received, they are consolidated in order to evaluate the new service 
assurance level. It is the server which is responsible of issuing alert messages when the security assurance 
reaches a critical level. The server can be interfaced with existing tools such as network Management 
Systems or Security Incident Managers for an efficient coordination of the security management. 
The assurance measurement platform role is to gather the measures for the computing of the security 
assurance level. Owing to the high complexity of telecommunication infrastructures and the distributed 
nature of these systems, BUGYO proposes multi- agents system architecture for the accomplishment of the 
measurement. The hierarchical structure of that architecture is depicted in figure 4 where a server agent 
receiving the server requests and determining the measures to be performed and the sub domain where the 
target network entity is; mux-agents responsible for dispatching the measure requests to the concerned 
probe-agents (adaptation interface between the probes performing the measures and the assurance 
measurement framework). The probe-agents perform the measures and send the results back to the server 
through the mux-agents.   
 
2. Application to a VoIP infrastructure 
 
The Bugyo framework is applied on a VoIP platform (figure 5), based on open sources components, and 
composed of several servers: 
 The IPBX server (open source in license GPL) allows interoperability between a phone switch 
deployed on Linux and: 
  
• Message recorder 
• Conference call 
• Calls Distribution  
 The DNS server. 
 RADIUS and TFTP server for the identification of the users 
 Virtual machines (VMware) that has the following advantages: 
• Decreasing the number of needed physical machines 
• Portability of the virtual machines 
• Linux operating system on a Windows machine (and/or inversely) 
 Soft-phones and hard-phones allowing testing our architecture.  
 Classical network components such as Firewall, routers and VPN gateways. 
The deployment of the methodology is based on the usage of a Multi Agents System (MAS) platform using 
Jade. 
For the purpose of applying the methodology, we consider two scenarios that will enable the specification 
of metrics. In the first case, errors have been injected into the address resolution file for waiter DNS Bind9. 
The 
second scenario is about modifying the configuration files for waiter TFTP. It is important to notify that 
this demonstration mainly focus on step 2-5 of the methodology, especially on the specification of metrics. 
2.1. The DNS example 
The objective of this metric is to provide security assurance information about the DNS service, and 
uncorrupted name resolution. Therefore the infrastructure of concern has been identified as the DNS 9 and 
the countermeasures to control, the security functions that checks the address resolution files integrity 
and the DNS user (bind) integrity. 
 
                             Figure5. VoIP observed system 
  
This metric provides an assurance level for the compliance and non-vulnerability of the controlled counter-
measures. A summary of the metric and the associated derived measures are shown in the diagram below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                   Figure6. Metrics diagram for DNS 
For pragmatic reason, we assume that the achievable assurance level is 2, i.e. regular informal evidence for 
relevant parts of the countermeasures are sufficient to judge on the effectiveness of the security functions. 
3.1.1. Derived measure 1 
 
 In this test, two probes are used for the measurement of the derived measures: 
• The Samhain using cryptographic checksums of files to detect modifications. An effective 
functioning of that probe will allow the detection of any malicious attack that could lead to the 
address resolution files integrity being corrupted. 
• Scripts checking whether the resolution files are well constructed. 
The checking frequency assigned to these two probes is one hour. The table below lists the necessary base 
measures and references to provide complete security assurance information. 
 
Reference Base measures Required probes Frequency 
DNS conversion files 
integrity 
Check the integrity of 
address resolution file. 
Samhain 1 hour 
DNS conversion files 
construction. 
Files corrupted: Check if 
the resolution files 
content is well 
constructed. 
Scripts 1 hour 
 
                   Table2. Requirements for DNS metrics measurement (derived measure1) 
A n illi c it m od ifica tion  o f the  D N S 
co n figu ra tio n  ca n  c au se the  
trans m iss io n  o f m a lic io us
in fo rm at ion s a nd  affe c tin g  the  
sec u rity  o f th e  D N S d epe nde n t 
e le m e n ts
R is k s fo r  th e  se rv ic e
C he c k  the ad ress  reso lu tion file s 
,a nd  th e in te g rity o f the
con figu rat ion  D N S file
C o u n te r-m e a s u re s
C he ck  the  a d dre ss  re s o lu tio n  
file s ’ in te g rity
T a b le  w ith  a ll  D N S file s
R e fe ren ce
C he ck  the  a d d re s s  
re so lu tio n  f ile s ’
in te g rity
B as e  m ea sure s
Sa m ha in , sc rip ts
P r obes
D e rive d  m e a s u re 2
C he ck  the  in te gr ity  o f the  D N S  
use r (b ind ).
N orm al iden tity  righ ts  
and  pe rm iss io n  a nd  
group s  o f  the  ‘b ind ’u se r
/e tc /gro up
/e tc /p a ssw d
R e fe ren ce
-C he c k th e in te g r ity o f 
the  b ind use r.
B a se  m e as ures
Sc rip ts
P r obe s
D e rive d m e as u re 1
  
 
Taking into account the achievable assurance level provided in 1, three case scenarios are possible: 
• If the address resolution files integrity is compromised: corrupted files, errors (configuration 
errors) then the derived measure value is 0. 
• If the address resolution files integrity is compromised: corrupted files, evil-minded modifications 
then the derived measure is 1. 
In both above cases, an appropriate alarm message is generated to the operator, providing details 
on the problem. 
• Otherwise, the resulting derived measure is 2. 
 
3.1.2. Derived measure 2 
 
For this derived measure, only scripts are used to perform checks on whether the bind user has a correct 
identity, specific right and permission and if he/she belongs to a specific group. In that respect, specifics 
checks are made (hourly rate) on the user’s identity through file, password checking…and also on whether 
the user is affiliated to the right group. Table 3 lists the base measures necessary to provide security 
assurance information. 
Similarly to Derived measure 1, three case scenarios are predictable: 
• The bind user’s identity (/etc/password) is compromised, then the derived measured is 0 and an 
alarm message is issued to the operator notifying him/her of the risk. 
• The bind user’s identity is safe, but he/she belong to the wrong group. In that case the derived 
measure is 1 and an appropriate message is displayed to the operator. 
• Otherwise, the derived measure is 2.  
 
Reference Base measures    Required probes Frequency 
Integrity of bind user: 
identity. 
Check if the bind user has 
a correct identity, specific 
right and permission. 
etc/passwd). 
    Scripts  1 hour 
Integrity of bind user: 
groups. 
Check if the bind user 
belongs to the wrong 
groups. 
    Scripts 1hour 
 
                      Table3. Requirements for DNS metrics measurement (derived measure2) 
 
3.1.3 Aggregated measure for the DNS metrics 
 
  
A finale table on both derived measures and the metric values is summarized in table 4. 
Derived measures 
Metric value 
0 1 2 
Check the address 
resolution files’ integrity 
Files corrupted: 
Errors, misconfigured. 
Files corrupted: evil-
minded modifications. 
OK 
Check the DNS user’s 
(bind) integrity 
Full integrity 
unsatisfied 
Integrity satisfied but 
bind user belongs to the 
wrong groups. 
OK 
                                 Table4. DNS metric value 
Using the minimum recursive function, the metric value of the countermeasures is given by the equation 
below: 
Metric value= Min (derived measure 1, derived measure 2) = Min (address resolution files integrity, checking 
the DNS user (bind) integrity) 
 
3.2. The FTFP metric example 
 
This metric aims at providing security assurance information about the configuration and the security of 
Trivial Transfer File Protocol server. Therefore the critical infrastructure is the TFTPD and the security 
countermeasure to control is the security settings of the TFTP configuration file. The metric indicates an 
assurance level for the conformity of the controlled countermeasure. 
 
                                          Figure7. Metrics diagram for DNS 
 
Here the achievable assurance level is set at 3 i.e. frequent informal evidences for important parts of the 
countermeasure is enough to appreciate on the effectiveness of the security functions.  
A n  i l l ic i t e  m o d if ic a t io n  o f  th e  
T F T P  c o n f ig u ra t io n  c a n
je o p a rd i z e th e  s e rv ic e .
R is k s fo r  th e  s e r v ic e
S e t  th e  T F T P  s e rv e r  s e c u r i t y  p a r a m e te r s  s o  th a t  t h e  T F T P  s e r v e r  
c o n f ig u ra t io n  c a n n o t  b e  m o d if ie d  b y  a  m a l ic io u s  u s e r
C o u n te r -m e a s u r e s
P ro te c t e d  m o d e
D e r iv e d m e a s u r e
• /e tc /x in e td .d / t f tp
• C o n f ig u ra t io n  f i l e  i n t e g r i ty
• R e s t a r t  d a te  o f  th e  p ro c e s s m u s t  b e p o s te r io r to  th e  
m o d if ic a t io n ’ s d a t e  o f  c o n f ig u r a t io n  f i le
R e fe r e n c e
• C h e c k  th e  ro o t p a th o f  th e  s e rv e r  (d if f e re n t f ro m c r i t i c a l
s y s t e m  p a th )
• C h e c k  th e  a l lo w e d u s e r ,  a b l e  to  a c c e s s th e  u s e r s ’ f i l e s .
• C h e c k  th e  in t e g r i ty o f  th e  f i l e
• C o m p a re  th e  r e s t a r t  d a te  o f  th e  p ro c e s s (p s - a u x )  a n d  
th e  c o n f ig u r a t io n  f i le  m o d if ic a t io n  d a t e
B a s e  m e a s u r e s
S c r ip ts  a n d  S a m h a in
P r o b e s
  
 Using probes (scripts and Samhain) the following checks are made: 
• Check the security settings of the TFTP server configuration file (/etc/xinetd.d/tftp) as shown 
below  
      
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Check if the server is “chrooted” (root path (server_args) of the hosted files is not a critical system 
path (e.g. ”/”, “/root”, etc). 
• Check if the specified Unix user (“user = nobody”) through which the TFTP users are able to 
access to the TFTP hosted files is uncorrupted or not too powerful (e.g. “root” user). 
• Check the integrity of the TFTP server configuration file. 
• Check the integration of configuration changes (re-starting date of the process). 
To check if the TFTP server has been restarted after a modification of the configuration file, we 
need a script to check the last modification date. This date must be anterior to the start date of the 
process (xinedt) and can be obtained with the “ps –aux” command. 
 
Reference Base measures Required probes Frequency 
Server path “server_args” value Script 1 hour 
TFTP user “user” value Script 1 hour 
TFTP configuration 
file integrity 
Integrity is compromised Samhain 5 minutes 
Configuration 
enforcement 
Server runs with new/previous 
configuration 
Script 5 minutes 
 
                           Table5. Requirements for TFTP metric measurement 
 
Based on the interpretation made by the probes and also on the achievable assurance level, four cases are 
predictable: 
 
• The content of the TFTP file configuration is not satisfactory and in that case the derived measure 
value is 0. 
 
 
service tftp 
{ 
protocol        = udp 
port            = 69 
socket_type     = dgram 
wait            = yes 
user            = nobody 
server          = /usr/sbin/in.tftpd 
server_args     = /tftpboot 
disable         = no 
} 
 
  
• The content of the TFTP file configuration is satisfactory but the restart date is anterior to the last 
modification date, the derived measure value is 1. 
 
• The content of the TFTP file configuration and restart date are satisfactory but the integrity is 
compromised, the derived measure value is 2. 
 
• All base measures are satisfactory; the derived measure value is 3. 
In all the above cases, exception made of the last one, an alarm message is generated to the operator 
specifying the nature of the security risk.  
 
3.2.1 Aggregated derived measured  
 
Since there is only one derived measure, the Assurance level of the TFTPD is equal to the derived measures 
“protected mode” as depicted in the table below.  
                      Metric value= protected mode 
 
 
 
 
Derived measures 
Metric value 
0 1 2 3 
Protected mode 
 
Security 
parameters are not 
set. 
Security parameters 
set but restart date 
is older than last 
modification date 
All BM OK 
except 
integrity 
All BM OK 
 
                                 Table6. TFTP metric values  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
   In this paper, we successfully deployed a security assurance methodology for telecommunication 
infrastructure, BUGYO, by applying it to a VoIP infrastructure. The specification of metrics has helped 
determine the effectiveness of the security measures deployed on the infrastructure. From our experience, a 
good understanding of the infrastructure is imperative for a better specification of the security model which 
will guarantee a better selection of metrics. 
  The Bugyo methodology could be used by companies to document, measure and monitor their security 
assurance and be compliant of governments’ requirements such as Sarbanes-Oxley and Basel II.  
 In terms of perspectives, the extension of the methodology in a way to handle security assurance in a 
  
dynamic environment is being explored along with the use of self-learning agents for the collection, 
measurement of the assurance levels. Furthermore, if it agreed on the need to know how effective the 
security countermeasures are in critical infrastructures, integrating automatic reaction measures that allow 
the system to respond to an imminent failure is also paramount and requires some attention.  
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